Авиакатастрофа в Тайване 04.02.15
true_pilot:
Опубликована расшифровка речевого и параметрического самописцев. Подтвердилось ложное срабатывание ATPCS, а так же ошибка экипажа по выключению рабочего двигателя. Они успели осознать свою ошибку. Пусть земля будет пухом...
10:51:39 GE 235 began takeoff roll
10:51:43 Pilot Monitoring (PM) called “no ATPCS armed”, and Pilot Flying (PF) replied “ok continue takeoff.” (ATPCS: Automatic Take-off Power Control System)
10:51:51 PM called “oh there it is ATPCS armed.” The aircraft lifted off and climbed out. Autopilot was engaged after after-takeoff check completed. The aircraft turned right after 1,000 ft.
10:52:38 After climbing through 1,200 ft. master warning sounded. Engine and Warning Display (EWD) showed “ENG2 FLAME OUT AT TAKE OFF” procedures.
10:52:41 PF disengaged autopilot while the flight climbing through 1,300 ft.
10:52:43 PF announced “I will pull back engine one throttle” and PM replied “wait a second cross check”. At this moment ENG1 PLA (Power Lever Angle) record indicated a reduction from 75 deg. to 66 deg.
10:53:00 PM replied “okay engine flameout check” and continued announcing “check up trim yes auto feather yes.”
10:53:06 PF said “pull back number one” and ENG1 PLA record showed a reduction to 49 deg. Meanwhile PM said “okay now number two engine flameout confirmed.”
10:53:09 PF replied “okay” ; however ENG1 PLA remained at 49 deg. The aircraft reached its highest altitude of 1,630 ft. and started to descend at 102 knots.
10:53:13 Stall warning sounded with stick shakers activated. PM called “okay push push back.”
10:53:15 PF said “shut” and PM replied “wait a second throttle throttle.” Between 10:53:13 and 10:53:15, ENG2 PLA was advanced to 86 deg. and ENG1 PLA was retarded to 34.5 deg. (idle position.)
10:53:19 PF said “number one”, followed by “feather shut off”. Meanwhile PM said “number feather”. Stall warning revived and stick pusher was in effect until 10:53:27
10:53:22 PM said “okay” and PF said “uh number one.”
10:53:24 ENG1 Condition Lever (CL) was in fuel shut off position. Six seconds later ENG1 propellers were in feather position.
10:53:35 PM declared emergency on engine flameout to Songshan tower. Between 10:53:46 and 10:54:04 PF attempted to reengaged autopilot twice but failed. The aircraft stalled again during the time.
10:54:05 PM said “both sides lost”. 2 seconds later PM said “no engine flameout we lost both sides.”
10:54:09 PF announced “restart the engine” while the aircraft was at 545 ft. with speed 105 knots.
10:54:20 ENG1 CL was advanced from fuel shut off position.
10:54:25 PM said “cannot restart it” while the aircraft was at 401 ft. with speed 106 knots. ENG1 NH1 speed recorded an increase to 30%.
10:54:27 PF said “wow pulled back the wrong side throttle” while aircraft was at 309 ft. with speed 105 knots.
10:54:34 “Pull-up” warning issued by Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS) sounded. The aircraft was at 83 ft. with speed 108 knots.
10:54:35 At altitude of 55 ft. with speed 106 knots, aircraft increased its left bank from 10 deg. to 80 deg. and its left wing collided with a taxi driving on an elevated expressway at the left bank of Keelung River. The left wing continued to hit the fence of the expressway as well as a light pole, before it crashed into Keelung River.
true_pilot:
The ASC confirmed, one person on the ground received serious, another minor injuries. 39 passengers and 4 crew on board of the aircraft perished, 13 passengers and 1 crew member survived with serious injuries, 1 passenger survived with minor injuries.
The ASC reported that engine #1 showed no anomaly and no unusual maintenance whatsoever.
The ASC reported, that engine #2 also showed no anomaly with no unusual maintenance. To investigate the reason for the uncommanded autofeather of the right hand engine the investigation performed a continuity check on the wiring harness between Auto Feather Unit (AFU) and the #1 torque sensor, all measurements were within permitted limits. Slight water ingress was found when the connectors were removed, but the connector pins were dry.
Both AFUs as well as another AFU, where another uncommanded autofeather had occurred after GE-235, were sent to the manufacturer for further examination. AFU #1 passed all tests by the manufacturer. AFU #2 of the accident aircraft however failed the continuity test, the resistance between pins J and H fluctuated when the cable was moved by hand, reaching a minimum value of 0.35Ohm. Pins J and H are connected to the torque sensor. Following extensive testing and revised testing methodes the soldering of pins inside the 90 degrees J2 connector were examined under an optical microscope as well as a scanning eletronic microscope, which discovered coarsening and cracking in the stress zone adjacent to pin/solder interface, further away the solder microstructure was intact.
The wiring harness to the torque sensor was tested extensively with no anomaly identified.
The readout of BITE memory of AFU #2 showed no erors prior to the accident flight following a maintenance reset. AFU #2 recorded a torque of engine #2 at less than 25% torque over a duration of more than 30 seconds which triggered the autofeather command.
The ASC reported that video surveillance from dash board cameras of vehicles were helpful to the investigation in addition to surveillance videos from two tall buildings nearby. The videos show the aircraft passed near one of the buildings (without contact), the first contact of the aircraft was with the taxi.
8 sets of seats (2 seats per set) in the aft fuselage, with their associated structures including seat belts, remained intact and in position, the other 28 sets were dislocated, most of them badly damaged and twisted.
Impact forces were predominantly from front to back and caused multiple traumatic injuries. The fatalities were caused by those traumatic injuries as well as drowning.
The ASC reported that there were two captains, Captain A (42, ATPL, 4,914 hours total, 3,151 hours on ATR-72-500, 250 hours on ATR-72-600) was pilot in command occupying the left hand seat being pilot flying, Captain B (45, ATPL, 6,922 hours total, 5,687 hours on ATR-72-500, 795 hours on ATR-72-600) occupied the right hand seat and was pilot monitoring, a first officer complemented the crew occupying the observer's seat, the first officer (63, ATPL, 16,121 hours total, 7,911 hours on MD-80s, 5,306 hours on ATR-72-500) was in conversion training to ATR-72-600 with 8 hours on the aircraft type.
Опубликовано с avherald.com
Glider_pilot:
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Ось Вам ще одна Ротмистривка:
А можно к вам на послеполетную подготовку? ;-)
подвашник:
Цитата: Серго от 17.02.2015, 19:24:55 pm
Так точно.
Після того випадку у Багдасарова в навчальних польотах з виключеннями двигунів гідрофлюгер не трогали.Був запломбований.
Гарна Ротмістровка. Мої вітання. :)
Я там "госпольот" перед випуском літав на Ан-26.
По левую руку, внизу,у правого, за центральным пультом рычаг- кран флюгирования...по разследованиям, некоторые вторые когда было нужно, не смогли дотянутся.. Авионика...специфическая.
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